Labour institutions and vulnerability of developing economies under capital inflows by Vladimir Matveenko
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Download by: [95.168.107.53] Date: 28 December 2016, At: 09:27
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: 1331-677X (Print) 1848-9664 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Labour institutions and vulnerability of developing
economies under capital inflows
Vladimir Matveenko
To cite this article: Vladimir Matveenko (2016) Labour institutions and vulnerability of
developing economies under capital inflows, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 29:1,
888-903, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2016.1193947
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2016.1193947
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 23 Nov 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 61
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Economic REsEaRch-Ekonomska istRaživanja, 2016
voL. 29, no. 1, 888–903
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2016.1193947
Labour institutions and vulnerability of developing 
economies under capital inflows
Vladimir Matveenko 
Department of Economics, national Research University higher school of Economics, st. Petersburg, Russia
ABSTRACT
The paper argues that labour institutions, such as efficiency wages 
or their analogues more typical for the former planned economies, 
can aggravate a vulnerability of developing economies caused by 
windfalls, such as additional oil income or foreign aid. The economy 
is modelled by use of the, so-called, fK endogenous growth model 
based on microfoundations describing the labour institutions. 
Despite a rather small formal difference, the model differs much in its 
properties from traditional growth models. The fK model generalises 
the well-known AK model but is free of the known shortcomings of 
the latter. Our analytical results as well as computer simulations show 
that, despite the presence of temporary acceleration opportunities, 
the unstable windfalls prohibit long-run sustainable growth. The 
windfall can be followed by a restructuring leading to a long-run 
economic decline after ceasing the capital inflow. The effect of the 
capital inflow depends on the relation between the expected inflow 
growth rate and the economic growth rate of the benchmark model 
(without inflow), as well as on the time preferences in the economy. If 
the capital inflow is expected to grow faster than the proper growth 
rate of the economy, this can lead to a decline in wages.
1. Introduction
It became a consensus last decade that there exists only a weak, if any, correlation between 
capital flows and growth, and the effectiveness of capital inflows largely depends on the 
institutions and policies of recipient countries. However, the institutions are path-depend-
ent: they are defined not only by the soundness of the current economic management but 
also by the trajectory of previous development of the country. The aim of this paper is to 
argue that labour institutions, such as efficiency wages or their analogues more typical for 
former planned economies, contribute to a non-effectiveness of the capital inflows.
We will use an fK model – an endogenous growth model, which generalises the popular 
AK model but is free of the latter’s deficiencies. The production function in the fK model 
is based on microfoundations taking labour institutions into account. The role of capital 
inflows, such as foreign aid or additional oil income, is modelled as injecting an extra 
income into the economy. The form of production function stipulated by the institutions 
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leads to a presence of zones of economic growth and economic decline in the phase plane 
describing dynamics of the economy.
The situation with capital inflow in the form of aid or additional oil income, typical for 
some development economies, is a special case of a more general situation of an inflow of 
foreign capital improving the country’s position in short foreign assets but, often, changing 
for the worse its position in long foreign assets. There is a large empirical literature studying 
interconnections between capital inflows and other macroeconomic variables, in particular, 
domestic investment and growth rates (see for example, Aizenman, Jinjarak, & Park, 2013; 
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2008). These studies show that, despite there being 
a positive statistical dependence between capital inflows and growth rates, this depend-
ence may be explained by the fact that the main international capital flows are directed to 
countries with a good investment climate, which, by the way, is a factor of enlarging the 
inequality between developing countries.
Generally, as both theoretical (e.g. Benigno & Fornaro, 2014; Cardarelli, Elekdag, & Kose, 
2010) and empirical studies (e.g. Al-Sadig, 2013; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2005; Gourinchas 
& Jeanne, 2013) show, the influence of capital inflows on domestic investment is not sim-
ple, especially if possibilities for capital outflow from the country are open. For example, 
the inflow of capital to Latin America, as against Eastern Asia, matches an increase in 
consumption but not in domestic investment. Besides, an increase in domestic investment 
does not explain econometrically an acceleration of economic growth (Rogers, 2003). All 
this confirms a necessity to account for institutions in models of growth and development, 
and in models with capital inflows in particular.
Beside the general framework, our paper also contributes to more specialised current 
discussions on the institutional roots of the Dutch Disease and on the effectiveness of foreign 
aid, which stress the role of institutions in the country-acceptor (see, for example, Burnside 
& Dollar, 2000; Easterley, 2003; Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008; Chervin & Van 
Wijnbergen, 2010; Van der Ploeg, 2011; Frankel, 2012; Hirano, 2013).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the benchmark fK model is introduced. 
Its microfoundations based on labour institutions are demonstrated in Sections 3 and 4. 
In Section 5 basic properties of the fK model are presented. Section 6 formulates the ver-
sion of the fK model with capital inflow. Section 7 is devoted to analytical studying of the 
consequences of the windfalls such as foreign aid or additional oil income, and Section 8 
reports results of computer simulations. Section 9 concludes.
2. Benchmark fK model
The fK model is an endogenous growth model taking labour institutions into account. The 
benchmark fK model is formulated in the following way:
Yt = Ktf (Vt), t = 1, 2, ...
Yt = Kt+1Vt+1 + It+1,
Kt+1 = Kt + It+1,
It+1 ≥ 0,
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Here Yt is output in time period t, Kt is capital, Vt is wage (consumption) per unit of capital 
(or in a more general meaning, a circulating capital), Ct = KtVt is consumption (total wage 
bill), It is investment, ν ∊ (0, 1) is the fraction of capital remaining after depreciation (i.e. 
1 – ν is the depreciation rate). It is assumed that function f possesses the standard properties:
Initial values Y0 and K0 are given.
The non-negativity condition It+1 ≥ 0 implies that the investment is irreversible, i.e. the 
accumulated capital may not be used for consumption. This condition is equivalent to the 
inequality Yt ≥ νKtVt+1 which, in its turn, in the non-trivial case of Kt > 0, is equivalent to 
f(Vt) ≥ νVt+1.
Formally, the only serious difference in the formulation of the fK model in comparison 
with standard neoclassical growth models is the use of the production function Y = f(V)K. 
This production function is a generalisation of the function Y = AK(A = const) used in 
the AK model. A justification for the chosen form of production function on the basis of 
microeconomic models with labour institutions is given in Sections 3 and 4. A detailed 
mathematical analysis of the benchmark fK model is provided in Matveenko (2006).
Notice that the variable of consumption-to-capital ratio, V, also plays an important role 
in some other endogenous growth models – in the Uzawa-Lucas endogenous growth model 
in particular (see Korolev & Matveenko, 2006; Lucas, 1988; Xie, 1994).
The AK model, generalised by the fK model, was firstly discussed in Frankel (1962) but 
attracted special attention much later (see Aghion & Howitt, 2009; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 
1995), which can be explained by two reasons. First, the AK model is the simplest model 
of endogenous growth, and the interest to such models increased sharply in the last three 
decades. Second, the AK model belongs to the class of Harrod-Domar type models. The 
main conclusion from such a kind of models is the presence of a positive relation between 
the investment rate and the growth rate. For half a century, such models have being used 
in the practice of international financial organisations (see Dalgaard & Erickson, 2006; 
Easterley, 2002) and have served as a basis for decisions concerning the size of aid to devel-
oping countries. A failure of many attempts to accelerate development by the use of foreign 
aid called a new wave of interest to theoretical and empirical studies based on endogenous 
growth models.
Despite a relatively small difference in formulation, the fK model differs much in its 
properties from traditional neoclassical models, in which all balanced growth paths (BGP) 
have a common long-run growth rate, and the maximal production level is achieved under 
minimal wages. The fK model differs as well from the AK model, where there is no conver-
gence at all, as each path is balanced, and the investment rate and the growth rate are linked 
by a positive relation in the same way as in the Harrod-Domar model.
In the fK model a positive dependence between the investment rate and the growth rate 
takes place only under relatively small investment rates, while for higher investment rates 
the relation is negative. In such a way, the fK model demonstrates an inverted-U relationship 
(1)t = 0, 1, ...
f (0) = 0, f �(.) > 0, f ��(.) < 0,
(2)f
�(0) > 𝜈, lim
V→+∞
f �(V ) < 𝜈.
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between the investment rate and the growth rate. Thus, the empirical results which throw 
doubt upon the AK model do not contradict the fK model. In particular, the fK model 
identifies in which cases one ought to expect a failure of an attempt to accelerate growth 
by increasing investment.
3. Efficiency wages as a microfoundation of the fK model
Let us demonstrate some microeconomic foundations that take labour institutions into 
account and lead to the production function of the form Y = Kf(V). In this section, a model 
based on efficiency wages and, hence, related mostly to a market economy is considered. 
In Section 4, a model more related to a former planned economy (such as the Russian 
economy, for example) is proposed.
We will follow a version of the efficiency wages model described in Blanchard & Fisher 
(1989). Let production function F(K, e(w)N) depend on capital K and the effective labour 
e(w)N. Here, e(w) is an effort of the worker depending on her wage rate, w, and N is the 
labour (the number of workers or working hours). Function F possesses constant returns 
to scale and other standard neoclassical properties. Concerning the efforts function, it is 
assumed that e(0) < 0, e�(.) > 0, e��(.) < 0.
The firm finds the wage rate w̃ maximising the effective labour e(w)N given wage costs 
wN = kV. This problem is easily reduced to finding the unconditional maximum of the 
function e(w)/w. Hence, w̃ is a solution of the equation e′(w)w/e(w) = 1, which means that 
the effort function, e(w), has unit elasticity in point w̃. In spite of that, we obtain:
Function f(V) possesses the standard properties. We come precisely to the form of produc-
tion function used in the fK model.
We recall that a similar but simpler situation arises in the well-known Lewis’ two-sector 
development model (see Lewis, 1954; Ranis, 2006). In that model, at an initial stage of 
development, a competitive wage in industrial sector, ŵ, is tied to a wage in excess of a very 
low (‘zero’) marginal product in a relatively large agricultural sector with family cultivation. 
Hence, the production function in the industrial sector is
4. Microfoundations of the fK model taking into account labour institutions 
of a former planned economy
In this section a two-sector model of labour market is considered, which seems to be suit-
able for some of the former planned economies, the Russian economy in particular. The 
model includes an old sector and a new sector of the economy. The old sector consists of 
state enterprises as well as those former state firms that were privatised but faced no seri-
ous changes in management and labour relations. The new sector, in particular, provides 
moonlighting possibilities for workers of the old sector.





V ) = Kf (V ).
(4)F(K , L) = F(K ,
kV
ŵ
) = Kf (V ).
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Let a worker of the old sector possess a time T (for a period, e.g. for month) which she 
divides between time L1 of factual working in the old sector firm, time L2 of moonlighting, 
and leisure, Le:
The output of the old sector firm is described by a production function AF(K, NL1) which 
possesses constant returns to scale and other standard neoclassical properties. Here K is 
capital, N is the number of workers employed in the firm, A is the total factor productivity.
In the sphere of moonlighting the individual can find work for any time with an hourly 
wage rate w2. The wage may include the whole labour income in all various forms of its 
payment being practised in transition economies.
The individual’s preferences are described by a utility function U(C, Le) with standard 
properties. Here, C is the total wage received by the individual during the month, both in 
the old sector and in the sphere of moonlighting.
The old sector firm proposes the individual a package consisting of a factual time of work 
Lf (this flexible variable may differ from the working time stated in a formal contract) and a 
per month wage rate, w̄
1
. The individual may choose one of the following two alternatives:
(1)   to accept the proposal of the old sector firm and, if it is profitable for her, to sup-
plement the work in the firm by moonlighting, or
(2)   to reject the proposal of the old sector firm and to work only in the new sector. 
Thus, the individual solves the following problem




Lf  then the individual will prefer the second alternative, i.e. 
L1 = 0, but if w̄1 > w2L
f  she will choose the first alternative, i.e. L1 = L
f. In the boundary case 
we assume that the first variant is chosen: the old sector worker does not move.
It follows that if for each wage costs, kV = w̄
1
N, the firm maximises the factually gained 
labour, NLf, then it solves the problem
Evidently, in the solution point the following equation is fulfilled: NLf = kV/w2. Consequently 
the factual hourly wage in the old sector firm, wf = kV/(NLf), is equal to the reservation 
hourly wage, w2, and the output is equal to
where w2 is given parameter, and function f possesses the standard properties. We come to 
the same fK type production function as earlier.
Thus, the fK model emphasises the role played in some of the former planned econo-
mies by the factual labour supply, as well as the role in the formation of the factual labour 
supply played by the availability of moonlighting. Empirical research into the influence of 














































= Kf (V )
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the moonlighting possibilities on the labour supply in Russia during the transition period 
is reported in Matveenko and Saveliev (2005).
5. Properties of the benchmark fK model
The vector St = (Kt, Yt) will be considered as the state of the model in period t, and Vt as a 
control variable. Let a path {St} with an initial state S0 = (K0, Y0) have a control sequence 
{Vt}
∞
t=1. The variable q(St) = νKt + Yt will be referred to as the wealth of the economy in 
state St. We see that
The growth factors of the wealth, of the capital and of the output are, correspondingly:
In the special case of the AK model, these three growth factors do coincide. In the fK model, 
they coincide on any BGP, where Vt = V = const.
Notice that each path of pure consumption (i.e. such that It ≡ 0) converges to a BGP of 
pure consumption defined by the control Vν satisfying the equation
For each control V such that V ≤ Vν the path {St} defined by the initial state S0 = K0(1, f(V)) 
and constant control Vt ≡ V is a BGP with growth factor α(V). Conversely, each BGP can 
be described in such a way.
The maximal growth factor on a BGP is achieved under the control Ṽ  which is a solution 
of the equation f′(V) = α(V).
Suppose that 𝛼(Ṽ ) > 1, i.e. economic growth (but not decline) takes place. It is not 
difficult to see that in this case the equation α(V) = 1, which defines steady states, has two 
positive roots, V11 and V12, let V11 < V12 for definiteness. The inequality V12 < V
ν takes place.
For any V ∊ (V11, V12) the inequality α(V) > 1 is fulfilled, which means that a growth 
(not decline) takes place on a BGP with such control V. For V ∊ (0, V11) ∪ (V12, V
ν) the 
inequality α(V) < 1 is checked, which means an economic decline. The economic sense of 
the indicated conditions is that the economic decline takes place on those BGPs where the 
wage per unit of capital (wage ‘in a workshop’), V, is either too small or too high.
For unbalanced paths the condition of decline in period t + 1 > 1 is












































𝜈 + f (Vt)
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In the special case of the AK model, the condition of decline reduces to
i.e. the decline can be explained either by a too high a wage per unit of capital, or by a too 
small productivity (A < 1 – ν). However, in the AK model, in contrast to the fK model, 
decline cannot be caused by a too low wage per unit of capital, while the latter is an especially 
important case for many development countries and former planned economies.
Now, we turn our attention to a relation between the growth rate and the investment 
rate. Paths with constant investment rates, s ∊ (0, 1), will be referred as Solow paths. In the 
fK model:
Hence, a Solow path with investment rate s is described by the following difference equation:
which implies a monotonic convergence of the control sequence {Vt}
∞
t=1 to a steady control 
V(s). The steady control function V(s) decreases, as does its inverse function, s(V). The 
growth factor of output on a Solow path,
converges monotonically to ν + sf(V(s)).
It follows that in the fK model there is no permanent positive relation between the invest-
ment rate and the growth rate. The asymptotic growth factor of a Solow path (the growth 









In the AK model, on a Solow path:
hence, the growth factor is constant and equal to ν + sA. Thus, in the AK model there is 
always a positive relation between the investment rate and the growth factor. An assump-
tion of such a kind of relation, being a basis of the methodology of the international aid 
organisations, is a subject of criticism (see Dalgaard & Erickson, 2006; Easterley, 2002), and 
the absence of such permanent relation in the fK model seems to be its important merit.
To check consequences of the AK model empirically, Jones (1995) considers 15 OECD 
countries and comes to a conclusion that, in spite of the investment rates rising in the 
postwar period, the growth rates did not increase. In his opinion, this fact is witness to an 
insolvency of the AK model. This conclusion is disputed by McGrattan (1998) who considers 
a wider sample of countries for a longer time period. However, Nandi (2011) supports the 
Jones’ conclusion. Neither of these empirical evidences contradict the fK model.





f (Vt) − Vt+1
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Another difference in the properties of the models is that there is no convergence in the 
AK model, and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) mark this as the most important empirical 
shortcoming of the AK model, while the fK model is free of this shortcoming.
Now let us compare optimal paths of the fK model for several alternative optimality 
criteria. The optimal paths turn out to be constructed by use of a simple common rule. 
To each of the optimality criteria under consideration its own fixed generating control, 
V, corresponds. By use of the generating control, a current optimal control, Vt+1, is being 
constructed in the following way:
In other words, if the current output is high enough, then the generating control itself is 
used (Vt+1 = V); otherwise, no investment is made (It+1 = 0), i.e. the pure consumption takes 
place in period t + 1.
In particular, we compare the following optimality criteria.
A. Stepwise maximal output. Under this criterion, the economy moves from a current 
state St to that state St+1 which provides the maximal output Yt+1. The generating control 
V̄  for this criterion is the point of maximum of function f(V)/((1 + V). What is more, V̄  
satisfies the equation f ′(V) = f(V)/((1 + V).
B. Stepwise maximal profit. Under this criterion, the economy moves from a current state 
St to the state St+1 which provides the maximal profit, Yt+1 – Vt+1Kt+1. The corresponding 
generating control satisfies the equation f ′(V) = 1.
C. Pareto efficiency. A path {S̃t} is said to be Pareto efficient if there is no path {St} with the 




, such that Sk > S̃k at some period k. The corresponding generating 
control is Ṽ  which provides the maximal long-run growth factor (see above); this reminds 
us that it is a solution of equation f ′(V) = α(V).
D. Maximal discounted consumption. Let β ∊ (0, 1) be a subjective discount factor, and 
let the function
be maximised given initial state S0. The optimal path is called β-optimal. For 𝛽 ≥ 1∕𝛼(Ṽ ) 
the series (1) diverges and no β-optimal path exists. For 𝛽 ∈ (0, 1∕𝛼(Ṽ )) the generating 
control, V(β), is a solution of the equation 1 – β(ν + f(V)) + βVf’(V) = 0. For sufficiently 
small values of β, when the society is ‘impatient’, the inequality V(β) ≥ V12 is fulfilled, and 
economic decline takes place on β-optimal paths.
Various dynamic patterns are possible under criteria A – D. Basic cases are listed in 
Table 1.
6. The fK model with windfalls
Now, we turn to the fK model with windfalls, such as additional oil income or foreign aid. 












(19)Yt = Ktf (Vt), t = 1, 2, ...
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Here Yt is GDP in time period t, Wt is the (exogenous) real value of a windfall, Kt is capital, 
Vt is wage per unit of capital, Ct = Kt Vt is consumption (total wage bill), It is domestic 
investment, ν ∊ (0, 1) is the share of capital that remains after depreciation (i.e. 1 – ν is the 
depreciation rate). As above, it is assumed that function f possesses the standard neoclas-
sical properties.
First of all, let us indicate steady states in which the basic variables are constant: 
Wt = W ,Yt = Y ,Kt = K ,Vt = V . In such a case, K[(1 + V) - (ν + f(V)] =  W > 0, which 
means that α(V) < 1, where α(V) is the growth factor of the benchmark economy (without 
capital inflow) with the same control V. Hence, if the capital inflow is ceased, the economy 
finds itself on a path of economic decline. It means that the steady capital inflow promotes 
not a sustainable growth but a sustainable decline of the economy.
Now, assume that the capital inflow increases with a constant growth factor, ɛ. Of special 
interest are BGPs. Evidently, the three growth factors of the economy (growth factors of 
output, capital, and total consumption) are all equal to ɛ. Let ω be the inflow-to-capital ratio: 
ω = Wt/Kt. It may be seen that the corresponding control V satisfies the following equation:
Here again the capital inflow can induce a habit harmful for sustainable growth of the 
economy.
For example, suppose that parameters g̃ and ?̃? of the capital inflow are such that the 
corresponding control is Ṽ , which provides the Pareto efficient paths in the benchmark 
economy (criterion C introduced in Section 5). Under these parameters, the economic 
growth factor under windfall is equal to:
(20)Yt +Wt = Kt+1Vt+1 + It+1
(21)Kt+1 = Kt + It+1
It+1 ≥ 0
t = 0, 1, ...
(22) =
 + f (V ) + 
1 + V
(23)?̃? =
𝜈 + f (Ṽ ) + ?̃?
1 + Ṽ
Table 1. Patterns of optimal paths depending on generating control (V) and initial state (S0).
source: the author’s calculation.
0 < V < V11 V11 < V < V12 V12 < V < V
ν V > Vν
Y0 > νVK0 Proportional decline Proportional growth Proportional decline Lack of investment 
and decline
Y0 < νVK0 Lack of investment, 
then proportional 
decline
Lack of investment, 
then proportional 
growth
Lack of investment, 
then proportional 
decline
Lack of investment 
and decline
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Now, imagine that the oil prices increase, or the donors decide to accelerate the economic 
growth and increase the growth factor of the aid. With this bigger growth factor, ?̂?, equation 
(22) has a new solution, ⌢V ; however,
i.e. the temporary acceleration of the current economic growth later harms the sustainable 
growth when the oil prices fall or the aid is ceased. It is even possible that 𝛼(V̂ ) < 1, in 
which case the high oil prices (or big foreign aid budget) promote sustainable decline of 
the economy.
7. Consequences of non-stationary capital inflows
As in the benchmark model of Section 5, vector St = (Kt ,Yt) will be considered as a state of 
the economy in period t, and Vt as a control. Let the path {St} with an initial state S0 = (K0,Y0) 
have the control sequence {Vt}
∞
t=1, and let γt be the ratio of the windfall to the wealth of 
the economy:
It follows from equations (20) and (21) that
`From here we find the capital growth factor:
and the output growth factor:




Hence, the output growth factor is equal to
In period t, the unknown here is the control Vt+1, which has to be chosen according to an 
optimality criterion. We consider two different criteria.
(24)
𝜈 + f (V̂ )
1 + V̂
<







( + f (Vt))Kt



























































898   V. MATVEENKO
If the optimality criterion is A – the stepwise maximisation of the current output (see 
Section 5) – then Vt+1 = V̄ , where, we recall, V̄is a solution of the equation f’(V) = f(V)/
(1 + V). Under this optimality criterion, the choice of the control does not depend on the 
dynamics of the capital inflow. For example, if f (V ) = V 𝛽 , 0 < 𝛽 < 1, then V̄ = 𝛽
1−𝛽
.
For any constant control, Vt = V, the growth factor of the economy is equal to
where, as earlier, α(V) = (ν + f(V))/(1 + V) is the corresponding growth factor of the bench-
mark economy (without capital inflows). Given an initial state and a control V a sequence 
of the growth factors can be found recurrently from equation (31).
Another optimality criterion, which we now consider, is C – the maximal long-run 
growth rate (see Section 5). If the growth rate of the oil income or aid injections is expected 
to be less than the proper growth rate of the benchmark economy, then, as is seen from 
equation (31), the optimal control is Ṽ . Recall that 𝛼(Ṽ ) is the maximal growth factor of 
sustainable growth in the benchmark model (without inflow).




Ṽ . If the rates ɛt on average do 
not exceed 𝛼(Ṽ ), then, even with the inflows, the economy is unable to support a growth 
factor greater than 𝛼(Ṽ ) in a long run.
The matter stands differently if the inflow is expected to grow with a higher growth rate 
than the own growth rate of the economy. In such a case, under criterion C, equation (31) 
implies that the long-run economic growth rate increases when the control V approaches 
zero. Thus, the expectations of a sustainable growth of the windfall lead to a decrease in 
wages. The wages level in the economy is defined by the expectations concerning the pos-
sibilities of a leading growth of the capital inflow.
The explicit conditions of economic growth and recession found in Section 5 start work-
ing if the windfall injections become small in the long run in comparison with the volume 
of the economy. If the economy grows well, it does not need injections. However, it is also 
possible to support a badly growing (falling) economy by use of injections temporally.
Now, let us turn our attention to the relation between the investment rate and the growth 
rate. In the fK model with inflows, the saving rate is equal to:
It follows from here that
On a Solow path (where s = const):
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If inflow injections grow slower than the economy does, then on the Solow path the control 
sequence {Vt}
∞
t=1 converges to a steady control V(s), the same as in the benchmark fK model. 









. The sequence of the output growth factors converges monot-
onously to the steady value ν + sf(V(s)).
8. Computer simulations
Several computer simulations were conducted. The main attention was devoted to the ques-
tion: how do the dynamics of the economic growth depend on the dynamics of the capital 
inflow?
The production function of the fK model was specified as f (V ) = V  ,  ∈ (0; 1). The 
growth factor of the capital inflow was taken as constant: ɛt ≡ ɛ. Paths were simulated under 
two scenarios corresponding to the optimality criteria A (maximisation of the current 
output) and C (maximisation of the long-run growth rate).
For the first scenario, variants of dynamics of the economic growth factors, α, under 
different inflow growth factors, ɛ, are shown in Figure 1. It is easy to see that the economic 
growth factor converges to the growth factor of the inflow.
Recall that for BGPs of the benchmark fK model (without aid) there are definite condi-
tions of growth and decline (listed in Table 1). In the model with capital inflow under the 
first scenario, the situation is principally different: the long-run economic growth factor 
depends only on the inflow growth factor. In particular, under ɛ  >  1 (when the inflow 
increases) the economy enters a BGP of growth (not decline), while under ɛ < 1 (when 
the inflow decreases) an economic decline takes place. Thus, under the first scenario the 
economy is totally ‘tied’ to the capital inflow.
The situation changes under the second scenario assuming the goal of long-run economic 
growth (Figure 2). The economic growth factor converges asymptotically to the maximum 
of two values: the growth factor of the inflow and the maximal long-run growth factor of 
the benchmark economy (with no inflow). Formally, t ⟶
t→∞
max{;∗}.
Figure 1. Dynamics of the economic growth factor (α) depending on the inflow growth factor (ɛ): the case 
of criterion a (maximisation of the current output). source: the author’s calculation.
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By use of a computer optimization procedure (under particular parameters of the model) 
the maximal growth factor, α*, of the economy was found. In Figure 3, where ∗ = 1.12, the 
dynamics of the economy are shown under two different values of ε1 = 1.25 and ɛ2 = 0.9.
These results correspond to economic intuition. If the economy is oriented to a short-run 
criterion connected with maximisation of a current value (such as output), then an ability 
of some industries to grow and develop depends on the presence of external sources of 
financing. The leading role in such a situation will probably be played by industries ensuring 
a fast capital inflow into the country. On the contrary, if a long-run optimality criterion is 
preferable, such as maximisation of a long-run growth, then a probability appears that in 
some industries own hidden reserves will be found and used, which will be conductive for 
development of these industries on the basis of their own potential (these are the knowl-
edge-intensive industries first of all). Of course, in such a situation the capital inflow will 
not lose its importance as an additional source of investments, but it will not play such an 
essential role as earlier.
Figure 2. Dynamics of the economic growth factor (α) depending on the inflow growth factor (ɛ): the case 
of criterion c (maximisation of the sustainable growth factor). source: the author’s calculation.
Figure 3. Dynamics of the economic growth factor (α) depending on the growth factor of the inflow (ɛ): 
the case of criterion c (maximisation of the sustainable growth factor). source: the author’s calculation.
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9. Conclusion
We introduce an endogenous growth model (fK model) taking into account labour insti-
tutions and capital inflows, such as additional oil income or foreign aid. The presence of 
the institutions makes the behaviour of the model very different from the standard growth 
models usually used in policy analysis. The benchmark fK model (without capital inflows) 
demonstrates an inverse-U relation between the investment rate and the economic growth 
rate: a positive relation under low investment rates, but a negative relation under higher 
investment rates.
We study a version of the fK model with capital inflows. First, we analyse balanced 
growth paths and show that the windfall can be followed by a restructuring leading to a 
long-run economic decline after ceasing the capital inflow. Concerning non-balanced paths 
it can be concluded that the effect of the capital inflow depends on the relation between the 
expected inflow growth rate and the economic growth rate of the benchmark model (without 
inflow), as well as on the choice of the optimality criterion. If the optimality criterion is the 
maximisation of the current output, then the dynamics of the economy is entirely defined 
by the dynamics of the capital inflow.
Another optimality criterion under consideration is the maximisation of the long-run 
growth rate. We show that if the growth rate of the inflow is expected to be less than the 
growth rate of the benchmark economy (with no inflow) then the economy will follow 
a path of long-run sustainable growth. However, if the inflow is expected to grow with a 
higher rate than the proper growth rate of the economy, this can lead to a decline in wages.
Computer simulations show that, under a constant growth rate of the capital inflow 
and the short-run optimality criterion, the growth rate of the economy converges to the 
growth rate of the inflow. Under the long-run optimality criterion, the economic growth 
rate converges to the maximum of two values: the growth rate of the inflow and the maximal 
long-run growth rate of the benchmark economy (with no inflow).
All these results mean, in particular, that the volume of the capital inflow (such as addi-
tional oil income or aid) and its growth rate must be very carefully selected taking into 
account economic institutions in the country-recipient (labour institutions in particular). 
An insufficiently thought-out choice of parameters of the inflow may not lead to visible 
results, and, moreover, may even lead to promoting an economic decline after the windfall 
has ceased.
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